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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTH KAMAS IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appelloot, 
-Vs.-
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS' 
ASSOCIATION, 




NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Duchesne Tunnel conveys water from the Du-
chesne River to the Provo River. Appellant has an ap-
proved water filing to divert and beneficially use water 
from Little Deer Creek, and such water can be used most 
economically by bringing it through the Duchesne Tunnel. 
Respondent Provo River Water Users' Association, a 
mutual water corporation, operates and controls the 
Duchesne Tunnel pursuant to a contract with the United 
States Bureau of Reclamation. Appellant, also a mutual 
water corporation, owns shares of stock in Respondent 
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corporation and brought this action for a declaratory 
judgment, requesting the court to declare that appellant, 
as a stockholder in respondent mutual water corporation, 
has the right in common with other stockholders of the 
corporation to use all water conveyancing facilities which 
respondent corporation has the right to use. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No evidence was introduced in the court below. The 
facts recited in this brief, therefore, do not appear in the 
record, except as allegations in the complaint or admis-
sions in the Motion. Also, some reference is made to the 
public records in the office of the State Engineer, since 
this Court takes judicial notice of those records. 
Appellant, a mutual water corporation, owns shares 
of stock in respondent Provo River Water Users' Asso-
ciation, also a mutual water corporation. Appellant has 
a water right, independent of its shares of stock in re-
spondent, for 25 c.f.s. of water from Little Deer Creek. 
This water can be used most economically if the water is 
brought through the Duchesne Tunnel and connected 
facilities which were constructed as part of the Deer 
Creek Division of the Provo River Project, and financed 
by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (See Con-
tract attached to Motion). Legal title to these facilities 
was retained by the United States, but the operation has 
been turned over to respondent, and the facilities are 
operated and controlled for the benefit of the stockholders 
of respondent (Contract attached to Motion). 
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The water to which appellant has a right by its Appli-
cation No. 16063 has for several years been captured and 
used by respondent. Thus, when appellant requested use 
of the Duchesne Tunnel for conveying the water above-
mentioned, respondent refused to permit such use 
(Complaint). Further, the Bureau of Reclamation has 
attempted to obtain the water for which appellant has 
an approved application, and has made a junior filing, 
not yet approved (Application No. 30389, Misc. Book 
16, page 481). The file in the State Engineer's office on 
this junior application reveals that the Bureau has made 
repeated efforts to induce the State Engineer to lapse 
appellant's approved application and to approve the 
Bureau's junior application. Though this evidence was 
not introduced below in documentary form, it was brought 
out in oral argument in response to questions from the 
court, and, in any event, it is well settled in Utah that this 
Court will take judicial notice of the records in the office 
of the State Engineer: 
"Since the records of the State Engineer's Office 
are public records, we take judicial notice there-
of." McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 
447 (1948). 
Thus, the Bureau seeks a water right through its 
unapproved, junior filing on the very water for which 
appellant has an approved application. If the Bureau is 
successful, the use and benefit of the water will go, as 
it now does, to respondent Association, just as does all 
Project water (Contract attached to Motion). 
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Appellant :filed this action for a declaratory judg-
ment, requesting the court to adjudge that appellant, as 
a stockholder in respondent mutual water corporation, has 
the right in common with other stockholders of the cor-
poration to use all water conveyancing facilities which 
respondent mutual corporation has the right to use. 
Appellant did not seek and does not now seek to have the 
court construe respondent's contract with the Bureau of 
Reclamation. The relief sought is limited entirely to a 
declaration that appellant, as a stockholder of respond-
ent company, has the right in common with other stock-
holders to use all water conveyancing facilities of 
respondent company (whatever they are). 
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss in the court be-
low, and in support thereof argued that since respond-
ent's right to use the Duchesne Tunnel and all related 
facilities are governed by a contract between the United 
States and respondent Provo River Water Users' Asso-
ciation, the instant suit for a declaratory judgment would 
necessarily require the court to construe that .contract. 
Therefore, argued respondent, the United States is an 
indispensable party to the instant action, and since it can-
not be sued without its consent, and since it has not given 
its consent to the instant suit, the action must be dis-
missed. Accordingly, the lower court dismissed appel-
lant's complaint, and from that judgment of dismissal 
appellant has brought this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY, AND IN 
DISMISSING THE ACTION. 
(a) Appellant's Complaint Does Not Require Ad-
judication of Any Issues in Which the United 
States Has an Interest. 
The law relating to indispensable parties is not com-
plex, nor do we believe it is in dispute in the instant liti-
gation. We readily concede that if in this action we were 
trying to interpret respondent's contract with the Bureau 
of Reclamation, the United States would be an indis-
pensable party, and the trial court could have properly 
dismissed the complaint. But we do not seek to have the 
contract construed. One need only examine appellant's 
complaint to determine the relief prayed for - we seek 
only to have the court declare our rights as a stockholder 
of respondent Association. 
It is believed there will be no difficulty in applying 
the law. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
the applicable rule dealing with necessary joinder of 
parties. Though we have stated that we think the law is 
not in serious dispute, we will, prelirninarily, set forth the 
policy and purpose of the law in recognizing indispen-
sable parties, and in distinguishing them from condition-
ally necessary, proper and formal parties. 
A formal party is not a real party in interest but 
must be made a plaintiff or a defendant as a matter of 
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procedure, as the guardian where the real plaintiff is 
an infant (see, e.g., Moore's Federal Pra.ctice, Volume 3, 
page 2104). A proper party is one who has an interest 
in the litigation and who may join as plaintiff or be joined 
as defendant "because there is a question of law or fact 
common to the right or duty in which he is interested and 
another right sought to be enforced in the action and the 
rights or liabilities involved arise out of the same transac-
tion, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.'' 
(Moore's Federal Practice, Volume 3, page 2104). 
Rule 19 does not deal with formal or proper parties, 
but deals with compulsory joinder of parties, i.e., those 
parties whose presence before the court is either indis-
pensable or conditionally necessary. Conditionally nec-
essary parties are those persons having a joint interest 
and who must be joined as parties if they are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of process 
and venue and can be made parties without depriving 
the court of jurisdiction of the parties before it. But if 
the joinder would deprive the court of its jurisdiction of 
the parties before it, or if the court's jurisdiction over 
them can only be acquired by their consent or voluntary 
appearance, the court will proceed to render judgment, 
but the judgment rendered will not affect the rights or 
liabilities of absent persons (Rule 19 (b) ) . An indispen-
sable party is one who has a joint interest in the subject 
of the litigation, and must be joined as a party or the 
action will be dismissed (Moore, op. cit., supra, at 2104). 
The lower court ruled that in the instant action the 
United States was an indispensable party, thereby con-
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eluding that the United States had a joint interest in the 
relief prayed for in appellant's complaint. In so ruling 
the court erroneously construed appellant's complaint 
as a request for a declaratory judgment adjudicating the 
(lXtent of respondent's right to use the Duchesne Tunnel 
and connected facilities under the contract between 
respondent and the United States. Appellant's com-
plaint did not request such an adjudication. In order to 
understand the nature of the instant action it is necessary 
to identify two separate questions related to appellant's 
claim that it has a right to use the Duchesne Tunnel and 
connected facilities: 
1. Does appellant, as a stockholder in re-
spondent mutual water corporation, have a right 
to use in common with other stockholders of re-
spondent whatever rights respondent has to use 
the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities; and 
2. What rights, if any, does respondent 
Provo River Water Users' Association have to use 
the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities~ 
The first question is the only one with which the 
instant action is concerned. Admittedly, an answer to the 
second question might require, among other things, a 
construction of the meaning of the contract between re-
spondent and the United States. But appellant does not 
seek an answer to that question in this action. 
As we have observed, the lower court erroneously 
construed appellant's complaint as requiring an adjudi-
cation of both of the above questions. But it does not. 
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The prayer is limited to a determination of appellant's 
rights as a stockholder in a mutual water corporation. 
The judgment on that question wo-uld not concern or 
interest the United States in any manner. In order to 
frame a controversy justifying a declaratory judgment, 
appellant did recite in the complaint that respondent had 
a contractual right to use the Duchesne Tunnel and other 
facilities by virtue of its contract with the United States. 
Appellant did not ask the court to define, declare or adjud-
icate the nature or the extent of that right. It is not de-
nied that respondent has some right - and we seek only 
to have the court declare that respondent cannot exclude 
appellant from using such rights as respondent has 
(whatever they 'are). In other words, appellant alleged 
that it had a right as a stockholder in a mutual company 
which respondent company refused to recognize, and 
asked the court to declare the rights of a stockholder in a 
mutual water corporation. The prayer of appellant's com-
plaint requests. only: 
"that the court adjudicate, declare and determine 
that plaintiff is entitled, as a stockholder in defend-
ant mutual water corporation, to use and employ in 
common with other stockholders of defendant all 
of the .rights of defendant connected with the use 
of the Duchesne Tunnel and connected facilities 
so long as such use does not interfere with any 
other reasonable or necessary uses by defendant 
or its other stockholders.''· 
We emphasize that appellant's complaint recited that 
respondent had a contractual right to use the facilities 
in question purely for the purpose of framing the need 
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for a declaratory judgment. There was no prayer for 
a construction of the contract between respondent and 
the United States. 
It is submitted, then, that the United States has no 
joint interest, nor any interest, in the present litigation. 
The instant lawsuit is purely one between the stockholder 
and the corporation, seeking a declaratory judgment 
as to th,e rights of a stockholder in a mutual water cor-
poration. In fact, the United States could not even qual-
ify for permissive joinder as a proper party, since there 
is not even a question of law or fact common to a· right 
or duty in which the United States is interested. Per-
haps if we would have .added a second count to our com-
plaint asking the court to consider the meaning of the 
contract with the Bureau, then the United States would 
have been interested - but we did 'not raise this issue. 
The only possible interest the United States could have 
relates to its rights and duties under its contract with re-
spondent Association, and that contrac~ ~ill not be con-
strued as part of the present litigation. 
The issue on appeal is simply one of analyzing plain-
tiff's complaint. to determine what in fact app~llant has 
prayed for. The v~lidity of the analysis presented above 
is obvious from an examination of the face of the com-
plaint. Nevertheless,' the lower court has erroneously held 
that the United States is an indispensable party. Prob-
ably it is this matter, and not the law, which divides the 
parties. If the contract with the Bureau must be con-
strued in order for the court to declare that a stockholder 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in a mutual company has the right to use facilities and 
rights of the mutual company, then we concede that the 
United States is an indispensable party. But if it is pos-
sible to declare what a stockholder's rights are under 
the Articles of Incorporation and under the law of mutual 
irrigation companies, without also construing the pur-
chase contract, then the court is wrong. Therefore, we will 
briefly set forth the criteria for determining who are 
indispensable parties, and the policy considerations which 
should guide the court. 
There are no clear-cut rules which can be applied 
in every case to distinguish indispensable parties from 
necessary parties, but the determination is made on the 
facts of the particular case, guided by certain basic prin-
ciples. The landmark case in this area of the law, Shields 
v. Barrow, 17 How 130 (1854), is discussed by Professor 
Moore as follows : 
''In spite of the vast number of cases that have 
arisen concerning who are necessary and who are 
indispensable parties, the governing principles 
have remained comparatively simple and constant. 
Most often cited for these principles is the case of 
Shields v. Barrow, in which Mr. Justice Curtis 
said, 'persons having an interest in the contro-
versy, and who ought to be made parties, in order 
that the court may act on that rule which requires 
it to decide on, and finally determine rights in it 
. . . are commonly termed necessary parties ; but 
if their interests are separable from those of the 
parties before the court so that the court can pro-
ceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, 
without affecting other persons, not before the 
court, the latter are not indispensable parties. 
10 
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Persons who not only have an interest in the con-
troversy, but an interest of such a nature that a 
final decree cannot be made without either affect-
ing that interest, or leaving the controversy in such 
a condition that its final termination may be wholly 
inconsistent with equity and in good conscience' 
are indispensable parties.'' Moore's Federal Prac-
tice, Volume 3, Page 2150 (emphasis added). 
There are two counter-balancing policies of equal 
importance which serve as guides in distinguishing be-
tween indispensable and necessary parties. One is the 
desire to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits and to bring all 
interested parties before the court so that a final judg-
ment can be entered which will be binding on all the 
parties; the counter-balancing policy is the desire to have 
some adjudication rather than none, and when the parties 
otherwise would be left remediless, the court will strain 
hard to permit some adjudication. This is illustrated by 
Professor Moore, who in turn cites Mr. Justice Suther-
land speaking for the United States Supreme Court: 
"In spite of the simplicity of the principles, how-
ever, their application to cases in which it is essen-
tial to distinguish between necessary and indispen-
sable parties, bears out the statement made by the 
Supreme Court that 'there is no prescribed form-
ula for determining in every case whether a person 
or corporation is an indispensable party or not.' 
On the one hand is the desirability of preventing 
a multiplicity of suits, and that there might be a 
complete and final decree between all parties inter-
ested. Opposed to this is the desirability of having 
some adjudication, if at all possible, rather than 
none, that leaves the parties remediless due to an 
ideaL desire to have all interested persons before 
11 
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the court. This thought was well expressed by Mr. 
Justice Sutherland in Bourdieu v. Pacific Western 
Oil Co. as follows: 
'The rUle, is that. if the merits of the cause may 
be. determined without prejudice to the rights 
of necessary partie~, absent and beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court, it will be done ; and 
a court of equity will strain hard to reach that 
· result. (citing cases) 
'We refer to the rule established by these au-
thorities because it' illustrates the diligence 
with which ·courts of equity will seek a way 
to adjudicate the merits of a case in the ab-
s'ence of . interested patties that cannot be 
brought in.' ''. Moore '.s Federal Practice, Vol:-
ume 3, Page 2154. . 
The.la,w relati.ng to in9.ispensa,ble and necessary P.ar-
ties is the sa~e in actions for. declaratory judgments as 
in other actions : 
. ''The general theory a~ . to who are ind,ispensable 
and ne.cessary parties applies to suits for declara-
tory judgments. Obviously, an indispensable party 
must be joined -in a declaratory judgment action, 
just as in gny other, since· the court could not pro-
ceed to enter an equitable judgment in the absence 
of such party. But we ha.ve called attention to the 
desirability o.f riot expanding the concept of indis-
pensable pa;rties to the point that parties, having 
.rights· warrarnting adjudication, are left remedi-
less, if. it is at all possible to proceed with the 
12 
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parties before the court, and that' a court of equity 
will strain hard to rea.ch that result.' As a result of 
this, and due to the flexibility of the declaratory 
judgment procedure there may be times when the 
court will be able to proceed, without prejudicing 
the rights of absent persons, when it would be dif-
ficult to do so under a more rigid procedure. On 
the other hand a declaratorly judgment action 
must serve a useful purpose, mainly in affording 
a remedy for rights or duties warranting adjudi-
cation, which could not be presented at all or only 
imperfectly under the older and traditional forms 
of procedure.'' Moore's Federal Practice, Volume 
3, Page 2197 (emphasis added). 
The Utah law is in harmony with the principles just 
cited. The Utah Supreme Court has said that: 
''Whenever a party has been omitted whose pres-
ence is so indispensable to a decision of the case 
upon its merits that a final decree cannot be made 
without materially affecting his interests, the court 
should not proceed to a decision of the case upon 
the merits." Hoyt v. Upper Marion Ditch Co., 
76 P. 2d 234. 
But that: 
'' ... it is not the uniform, unvarying practice to 
join as a party plaintiff or defendant every party 
having an interest in the subject matter or in 
granting or opposing the relief sought. There is 
the distinction between proper and necessary or 
indispensable parties. Thus, in actions to quiet 
title the plaintiff may join all or as many persons 
claiming adversely as he chooses and make them 
parties defendant. And the judgment will settle 
matters only as between those actually joined and 
13 
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served with process. In creditors' suits and in nu-
merous other actions by stockholders, creditors, 
heirs, or others, the plaintiff may join all or as 
many as he deems necessary or judicious in view 
of the nature of the relief he seeks and the ends 
in view. It is not always essential to jurisdiction 
that every party in interest be joined on the record 
at the outset.'' McCarthy et al v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah et al, 77 P. 2d 331. 
In summary, we think it is clear that the United 
States has no legitimate interest in an adjudication lim-
ited to the prayer of plaintiff's complaint. If the com-
plaint required a construction of the contract between 
respondent and the United States, in order to determine 
what rights respondent has against the United States, 
then the United States clearly would be an interested 
party, and, perhaps, an indispensable party. But the 
complaint does not request a construction of that contract, 
nor does it require the adjudication of any question in 
which the United States has an interest. 
If the present action is adjudicated on the merits 
in favor of appellant, and if respondent then refuses to 
permit appellant to use the facilities in question, claiming 
that it (respondent) does not have any right to use such 
facilities, appellant might then be required to bring a 
stockholder's derivative suit in the name of the corpora-
tion against the United States in the federal district court 
or in the court of claims. In such an action the United 
States could not plead its immunity from suit because the 
action would be on a contract to which the United States 
was a party and prosecuted in the name of the other 
14 
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contracting party. But the contingency of such a future 
lawsuit in the federal court in order to bring ultimate 
relief to appellant is quite immaterial on this appeal, 
except to show that the present action requires only an 
adjudication of rights between appellant and respondent, 
and to show that such present adjudication would serve 
a useful and necessary purpose as a foundation for a 
second lawsuit, if necessary, to bring appellant ultimate 
relief. 
We wish to emphasize that it is only after determin-
ing that a party has an interest in a lawsuit that the court 
determines if such party is necessary or indispensable. 
Under the prayer of appellant's complaint, it is clear that 
the United States has no interest in the present litiga-
tion, and the distinction between necessary and indis-
pensable parties is moot. But if this Court should deter-
mine that the United States has an interest in the instant 
lawsuit, the declaratory judgment prayed for by appel-
lant can be granted without prejudice to the United 
States, and, since appellant would otherwise be remedi-
less, the court will strain hard to permit some adjudica-
tion by designating the United States a conditionally 
necessary party, rather than an indispensable party. 
(b) If the Present Action Is Dismissed, Appellant 
Will Never Have Its Day in Court. 
The most fundamental concept in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence is that every person should be entitled to 
his day in court. A system of law which does not provide 
a procedure to permit a party to have his rights deter-
15 
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mined upon their merits seems wholly foreign to the con-
cept of justice as we know it. Yet, if this Court sustains 
the holding of the lower court, appellant will never have 
its day in court and, as a result thereof, will probably lose 
a valuable water right. 
The background facts· g1v1ng nse to the instant 
iitigation are illuminating, and were brought to the atten-
tion of the lower court in response to questions· from 
the court. 
The United States financed the· Deer Creek Division 
of the Provo River Project, pursuant to the contract 
mentioned earlier. Legal title to the water rights, stor-
age works and conveyancing facilities is in the United 
States,; but the control and management has been turned 
over to respondent Provo River Water Users' Associa-
tion, and the system is operated for the use and benefit 
of the stockholders of respondent .Association (Contract 
attached to Motion). 
As recited in the Statement of Facts, plaintiff's water 
right discussed in this litigation is an approved applica-
tion for 25 c.f.s. from Little Deer Creek (Application No. 
16063). At the present time, that water is not being used 
by appellant because appellant has no facilities to carry 
the water from Little Deer Creek to its diverting canals. 
But the water can be and is being captured by the Project 
facilities mentioned. Hence, the water in question is 
16 
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being taken and used each year by respondent Associa-
tion. Further, the United States has a junior filing on 
the same water, and is seeking approval of that applica-
tion from the State Engineer (Application No. 30389). 
These filings in the State Engineer's Office, under the 
case of McGarry v. Thompson, sup·ra, are judicially no-
ticed by this Court. If appellant is prevented from liti-
gating its right to use whatever facilities respondent 
Association has a right to use, and cannot otherwise use 
its water right, then the State Engineer ultimately will 
lapse appellant's application and approve the United 
States' junior application, and the use and benefit of the 
water will continue to go to respondent Association. It 
is thus clear that both the United States and the Provo 
River Water Users' Association will benefit if appellant 
is prevented from perfecting its use of the water. 
The "cooperation" between the United States and 
respondent Association is well illustrated by the present 
litigation. Respondent Association defends on the ground 
that the United States is an Indispensable Party and, 
therefore, there can be no adjudication upon the merits. 
The United States refuses to enter the litigation, enjoying 
its immunity from the present litigation. 
If appellant had attempted to bring a stockholder's 
derivative suit in the federal court against the United 
States for breach of contract or to construe the contract 
between the United States and the Association, the Asso-
ciation most certainly would have entered the litigation, 
17 
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claiming that preliminarily it must be determined that a 
stockholder can enjoy the same rights as the mutual cor-
poration. Thus, it would be asserted that such issue could 
not be adjudicated upon the merits because the Associa-
tion would be an indispensable party and if it were joined 
as a defendant there would be no diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction in the federal court between appellant and 
respondent Association to permit adjudication of the 
preliminary question. And so would go the merry-go-
round. 
Thus, appellant determined that the only procedure 
whereby its rights could be adjudicated would be to bring 
two successive (not alternative) lawsuits. First, a de-
claratory judgment action in the state court to declare 
that a stockholder in a mutual water corporation is en-
titled to use in common with the other stockholders all 
water conveyancing and storage facilities which the cor-
poration has a right to use. Second, if necessary, a stock-
holder's derivative suit against the United States based 
upon the contract between the United States and respond-
ent Association; establishing the Association's rights to 
use the facilities in question. Appellant might elect to 
bring an action for damages against the United States 
in the Court of Claims (Title 18, § 1491, U.S.C.A.) or 
in the Federal district court (Title 18, § 1346, U.S.C.A.), 
~nd any claim for damages as a result of the United 
.States' refusal to deliver water pursuant to the. contract 
would necessarily involve a construction of the meaning 
of the contract 
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Appellant's route to a legal remedy might seem 
somewhat arduous and circuituous, but it is the only pos-
sible remedy. And, such a circuituous route, if circuituous 
it be, is made necessary by the conduct of the United 
States and respondent Association. 
We do not seek to discredit either the United States 
or respondent Association in their desire to obtain the 
valuable water right owned by appellant. We do seek 
to discredit the method by which they hope to accomplish 
the result. Rather than litigate the merits to determine 
what the respective rights of the parties are, they seek 
to avoid any determination of the merits in the hope that 
appellant will not find a means of conveying and using 
the water and that the State Engineer will lapse appel-
lant's approved application and approve the United 
States' junior application. 
SUMMARY 
The only point raised on this appeal is whether the 
United States is an indispensable party to the present 
action. In asserting that it is not, we have presented the 
following arguments : 
(a) Appellant's complaint only requests an ad-
judication of rights as between appellant and 
respondent. The United States is not even an 
interested party in the instant litigation, much 
less an indispensable party ; 
(b) Even if the United States could be viewed as 
having an interest in the instant litigation, 
the law is clear to the effect that, when the 
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plaintiff would otherwise be remediless, the 
court will strain hard to consider the interest-
ed party to be only a necessary party, and 
not an indispensable party, so that some ad-
judication can be had; 
(c) The rights of appellant and respondent can 
be adjudicated without in any way binding or 
adjudicating the rights of the United States 
under its contract with respondent; 
(d) If appellant's present action is dismissed, it 
will never have its day in court, will never 
have its rights adjudicated upon their merits, 
and as a result thereof, will probably lose a 
valuable water right. 
It is respectfully urged that the United States is not 
an indispensable party to the present proceeding, and that 
the trial court erred in holding otherwise. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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